Abstract. The paper investigates the logic underlying statements of the form "X counts as Y in context C" which are commonly considered to represent the paradigmatic syntax of constitutive rules, i.e., the nonregulative component of normative systems. The analytical thesis backing the whole work consists in interpreting such statements as contextual classifications. This reading of counts-as is thoroughly investigated in two variants which we call the contextual classificatory reading and the proper contextual classificatory reading. The formal analysis of these readings, which we carry out making use of modal logic, disentangles two possible senses in which counts-as statements can be interpreted within a classificatory perspective, and clarifies the logical relations holding between them. The proposal is then compared in detail with previous work on the topic, in order to shed light on similarities, differences, and their grounds.
Introduction
According to many studies in legal and social theory, normative systems of high complexity, such as for instance legal systems or institutional ones, consist of regulative as well as non-regulative components ( [5, 28, 29, 42] ). That is, they do not only regulate existing forms of behavior, but they actually specify and create such forms:
As a start, we might say that regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior [...] . But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior ( [44] , p.33).
Since the publication of the first paper in deontic logic [49] , dating back to 1951, much research has been devoted to the study of the formal aspects of regulative rules (also known as conditional norms), giving rise to a considerable amount of literature 1 . Attention from researchers in logic to the second type of rules is instead only one decade old, [30] being the first contribution in this direction, and -to our knowledge-no more literature has been devoted to the formal analysis of constitutive rules until [17, 19] and [9] [10] [11] , which were motivated by recents developments in artificial intelligence such as the multi-agent systems (MAS) paradigm (see the [1] [2] [3] [4] conference series). In fact, some researches in MAS are heading toward the incorporation of the concepts of organization (organized interaction, see for instance [12] workshop) and institution (rule-based interaction, see for instance the [33] workshop) in computer systems, calling thus naturally for a rigorous understanding of the notion of constitutive rule. The present paper intends to contribute to this research line, aiming at providing a formal characterization of the logic underlying the reasoning with constitutive rules.
The paradigmatic syntax of constitutive rules has been taken to be, since [44] and [45] , the form of "counts-as" statements:
[...] "institutions" are systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional fact is underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of the form "X counts as Y in context C" ( [44] , pp.51-52).
The present work analyzes two main meanings that can be given to the statements "X counts as Y in context C" and identifies and discusses two formal semantics of counts-as statements representable via modal logic techniques. This is an aspect worth stressing. The formal characterization of counts-as statements we propose in this work is semantical in nature, our leading research question being: What does it mean that "X counts as Y in context C"? The present work can therefore be seen as an attempt to clarify the notion of counts-as disentangling some of its meanings and studying them formally by means of modal logic. The results presented integrate and expand work we have already done on the modal logic of counts-as in [24] , and which was in turn inspired by research we have carried out on the contextualization of terminological logics (see [21] [22] [23] ).
The paper is structured according to the following plan. In Section 2 the analytical thesis underpinning the whole work is presented and motivated. Section 3 provides some sketchy modal logic preliminaries. In Section 4 a modal logic characterization of counts-as statements as contextual classificatory statements is defined, and the syntactic properties of the resulting counts-as operator are investigated. In Section 5 some aspects of counts-as are touched upon which are not captured in the contextual classificatory reading. Then, following hints from legal and social theory, a stronger reading of the statements is proposed and the grounds for its modal logic characterization are laid. This last reading of counts-as, which we call proper contextual classification, is formally defined and studied in Section 6. The relationships between the two notions of contextual and proper contextual classification are studied in Section 7. In Section 8 the results of our formal analysis are throughly compared with work on the formal analysis of counts-as available in the literature. The comparison will be led both from a model-theoretic point of view, and from the point of view of the structural properties enjoyed by the various syntaxes of counts-as operators to be found in the literature. Finally, in Section 9, a recapitulation of our results and some concluding remarks follow.
Analytical Background
In this section we expose the analytical background assumed in this work. The informal ideas exposed here are then used as a guidance to provide the formal analysis of counts-as we are aiming at.
Subsumption as the basic ingredient of counts-as
In legal theory the non-regulative component of normative systems has been labeled in ways that emphasize a classificatory, as opposed to a normative or regulative, character: determinative rules ( [48] ), conceptual rules ( [13] ), qualification norms ( [40] ), definitional norms ( [29] ). Constitutive rules are definitional in character:
The rules for checkmate or touchdown must 'define' checkmate in chess or touchdown in American Football [...]( [44] , p.34).
Focusing on this feature, a first reading of counts-as is readily available: countsas statements express classifications. For example, they express what is classified to be a checkmate in chess, or a touchdown in American Football.
In the light of this classificatory view of counts-as, the way to establish a formal characterization of counts-as statements is extremely plain: if countsas statements yield classifications, this means that they function as conceptual subsumption relations, that is, counts-as statements assert just that a concept X is a subconcept of a concept Y . This analysis is inspired by the consideration of some well-known problems of underspecification, or more technically opentexture ( [28] ), typical of legal terminologies. We quote an excerpt from [27] neatly exposing this type of problems.
[Suppose a] legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? [. . . ] If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general words we use like "vehicle" in the case I consider must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application. There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. [. . . ] We may call the problems which arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning "problems of the penumbra"; they are always with us whether in relation to such trivial things as the regulation of the use of the public park or in relation to the multidimensional generalities of a constitution.
Such "problems of the penumbra" can be indeed rephrased in terms of questions of the form what counts as what: "what does count as a vehicle?". The fact that bicycles count as vehicles would then be read as: "instances of the concept bicycle are always instances of the concept vehicle". In [22] , these assertions are represented as mere conceptual subsumptions, i.e., expressions of the kind bicycle vehicle. The semantics of these expressions is elementary. Given a domain D of entities, and an interpretation function I of the concepts, a model m = D, I satisfies the expression bicycle vehicle iff I(bicycle) ⊆ I(vehicle)
2 . Therefore, the classificatory aspect of counts-as can be formally captured by conceptual subsumptions.
Via such classificatory statements, normative systems can establish the ontology they use in order to distribute obligations, rights, prohibitions, permissions. Vehicles are not admitted in public parks (general norm), but then, if bicycles are vehicles (classification), bicycles are not admitted in public parks (specific norm). The term vehicle works in this case as a sort of "middle term" ( [6, 32] ), mediating between the general and the specific norm, and the countsas statement provides the classification necessary for the derivation to soundly take place. This interplay phenomenon between regulative and non-regulative components, between norms and classificatory statements, is a crucial feature of normative systems ( [5] ). As we have already upheld in [20] , our claim is that this interplay works on a classificatory, i.e., terminological basis and that counts-as is a kind of basic brick of these classifications. Each normative system, via its constitutive rules, states a set of classifications, i.e., a terminology which provides a conceptualization of the domain of entities it is supposed to regulate.
Counts-as as contextual subsumption
However, the classifications expressed by counts-as statements are not absolute. They only hold in relation with a context, that is, in relation with the normative system to which they pertain: "X counts as Y in context C".
In fact, a same thing can in some cases be considered to be a vehicle, and in some others not: what counts as a vehicle in one public park regulation might well not count as a vehicle in another public park regulation. Counts-as statements need therefore to be analyzed as subsumption statements which do not hold unconditionally, but only with respect to a specific normative system. This is clarified elaborating on the simple example introduced above. Consider two normative systems a and b regulating the traffic within public parks in two different municipalities. The non-regulative part of normative system a consists of the two constitutive rules: "bicycles are vehicles", "cars are vehicles". The non-regulative part of normative system b consists instead only of the rule: "cars are vehicles". According to (in the context of) b, thus, we are not entitled to say that bicycles count as vehicles, according to (in the context of) a, instead, bicycles do count as vehicles. In both a and b cars count as vehicles. The non-regulative part of these systems might be formally specified on a language L traffic containing at least the following atomic concepts: vehicle, bicycle, car. A formal specification of the different classifications holding in the two systems a and b should then be able to express that the subsumption of the concept bicycle under the concept vehicle holds in the context of a, but not in the context of b, and that the subsumption of the concept car under the concept vehicle holds in both contexts. Put formally:
where M a and M b are sets of models m for L traffic . Those sets of models represent the contexts of the subsumptions: in the example, M b is a context of bicycle vehicle and car vehicle. Contexts represent the set of possible interpretations which a normative system assumes for the concepts at issue: in the example, M b is the set of interpretations that normative system b assumes as possible for the concepts in L traffic on the basis of its constitutive rules, i.e., car vehicle. To put it in yet another way, the non-regulative part of a normative system consists of a set of constitutive rules specifying its terminology. As such, it determines a set of interpretations, i.e., the set of models which satisfy its terminology. This set of models is what we call the context of the counts-as statements concerning that normative system 3 . To sum up, the analytical option we put forth for the interpretation of Searlean statements "X counts as Y in context C"consists in viewing them as conceptual subsumptions which are made true by a specific set of interpretations of the concepts occurring in the statements. So, the ingredients we are working with are a notion of subsumption, or put it another way, of "being sufficient condition for"; and a notion of truth according to an interpretation, i.e., nothing but a modal state or possible world. We will thus tackle the formal analysis of counts-as in a modal logic setting.
Logical Preliminaries
We first introduce the languages we are going to work with: propositional finite n-modal languages ML n ( [16] ). The alphabet of ML n contains: a finite set P of propositional atoms p; the set of boolean connectives {¬, ∧, ∨, →}; a finite nonempty set of n (context) indexes C, and the operators [ ] and . Metavariables i, j, ... are used for denoting elements of C. The set of well formed formulae φ of ML n is then defined by the following BNF:
We will refer to formulae in which at least one modal operator occurs as modalized formulae. Modalized formulae in which all non-logical symbols occur in the scope of a modal operator are called contextual formulae. Formulae in which no modal operator occurs are called instead objective, and we denote them using the metavariables γ 1 , γ 2 , . . ..
Semantics for these languages is given via structures M = F, I , where:
-F is a multi-frame, i.e., a structure W, {R i } i∈C , where W is the set of states (possible worlds) and {R i } i∈C is a family of n accessibility relations (|C| = n). We will refer to the set of accessible worlds from a world w via a relation R i as r i (w).
-I is an evluation function F : P −→ P(W ) associating to each atom the set of states which make it true. Satisfaction for these languages is then defined as follows:
interested in a logic that can "locally" behave like an S5 logic but that can "globally" behave in a weaker way allowing for different (thus possibly inconsistent) classificatory representations at the same time.
In other words, we should find a multi-modal logic enabling as many modalities as the to be represented contexts, and retaining for these modalities as many characteristics of S5 as possible, but at the same time allowing for the satisfiability of expressions such as:
A class of frames characterized by S5 logic is the class Univ of universal frames, i.e., the class of frames s.t. ∀w, w ∈ W : wR 1 w . The question is then what kind of n-frames can meet our requirements.
Frames with contexts
The candidate can be found in a quite well investigated class of multi-frames, that is, the class Cxt of n-frames such that Cxt is locally universal 4 , i.e.:
-For all R i ∈ {R i } i∈C and w ∈ W , R i is universal on r i (w); -For all w, w ∈ W , r i (w) = r i (w ).
That is to say, that every world has access via R i to the same set of worlds, which we denote as W i , and R i is also universal on that set. Leaving technicalities aside, these properties for {R i } i∈C cluster the domain of the frame in (possibly empty) sets of worlds, one for each accessibility relation and define these accessibility relations in such a way that the set of accessible worlds corresponds, for each world in W , to the cluster. Yet an easier way to express this is to say that these multi-frames define, via {R i } i∈C , n consistent contexts, i.e., n (possibly empty) sets of worlds. Noticeably, this class of frames implements in a straightforward way the thesis developed in context modeling according to which contexts can be soundly represented as sets of possible worlds (see [46] ). In fact, Cxt multi-frames can be conveniently represented replacing the family of accessibility relations R i ∈ {R i } i∈C with the family of sets {W i } i∈C Definition 1. (Cxt multi-frames) A Cxt multi-frame F is a structure F = W, {W i } i∈C , where W is a finite set of states (possible worlds) and {W i } i∈C is a family of subsets of W .
It may also be instructive to notice that these clusters can overlap. In fact, being sets of worlds, they can be ordered via set theoretic inclusion and the usual set theoretic operations can be defined on them 5 . Because of all these features, the class Cxt appears to be the natural candidate for translating, into a modal logic setting, the notion of context as set of (monadic first-order) models sketched in Section 2.
Models for a ML n can be built on Cxt multi-frames in the obvious way. The satisfaction relation, then, results in the following.
Definition 2. (Satisfaction based on Cxt multi-frames)
Let M be a model built on a Cxt multi-frame.
The obvious boolean clauses are omitted.
It is instructive to stress the change in the semantics of the modal operators induced by Cxt multi-frames. While in the general semantics for ML n languages, the truth of [i] and i formulae depends on the state from which the formula is evaluated (see Section 3), the truth of such formulae with respect to Cxt multi-frames abstracts from the point of evaluation. 
A multi-modal logic for contextual classifications
We have thus a class of frames which models the conception of context underlying our analysis. We have now to show that the class of Cxt multi-frames actually specifies a logic able to represent a number of different sets of classificatory statements, and that there exist axiomatizations characterizing this class of frames. We will thus get to the logic of contextual implication at which we are aiming. To do this, the following has now to be proven.
1. Consider a model M 1 based on a Univ frame for the language ML 1 with the only modal operators being [1] and 1 . This is a model for S5, making exactly the set of contextual formulae Φ on ML 1 true, the set Φ representing a set of classifications. There always exists a super-model M 0 of M 1 based on a Cxt frame for ML 1 and such that it makes exactly Φ true. Apart from technicalities, this means that the classificatory part (in this case represented by Φ) of a normative system considered in isolation, can be represented as the set of [1] -formulae which are true in a M 0 model (Proposition 1).
2. Consider a family {M i } 1≤i≤n of S5 models for ML 1 built on Univ frames.
There always exists a model M 0 based on Cxt for ML n such that M i |= φ iff M 0 |= φ , where φ is contextual and φ is obtained from φ uniformly substituting occurrences of the [1] and 1 -operators with occurrences of [i] and i , with i ∈ C. Obviously, an appropriate set of indexes c should be chosen so that |C| = n. This is just the multi-modal extension of the previous result: the classificatory part of each of n different normative systems can be represented as the set of [i]-formulae (with i ∈ C) which are true in a M 0 model (Proposition 2). 3. The K45 ij n logic is sound and complete with respect to the family of frames underlying the aforementioned models, that is the class of Cxt multi-frames. This logic, which has already been studied in [37] , is thus the candidate to provide a logical characterization of the notion of counts-as as it was exposed in Section 2 (Proposition 3).
There always exists a super-model M 0 = W 0 , R 0 , I 0 for ML 1 , with R 0 locally universal on W 0 , and such that:
Proof. The proposition is proven showing that it is always possible to obtain the desired structure
Proposition 2. (From many Univ models to one Cxt model) Consider now a set of models M 1 , . . . , M n for ML 1 on Univ frames and a language ML n such that |C| = n. Then there always exists a model M 0 for ML n on a Cxt multi-frame s.t. M 0 = W 0 , {R 0i } i∈C , I 0 on ML n and M i |= φ iff M 0 |= φ , where φ is contextual and φ is obtained from φ uniformally substituting occurrences of the [1] and 1 -operators with occurrences of [i] and i , for every i ∈ C.
Proof. Model M 0 can be obtained applying, for model M i = W i , R i , I i the construction used in proving Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 and 2 prove that locally universal multi-frames are the structures we are looking for because, to put it in a nutshell, they can represent a number of universal relations at the same time. With respect to this, it is worth noticing that Cxt multi-frames cannot just represent models for S5 statements, but they can also represent that such models do not exist. They can represent the absence of models for a set of classificatory statements, that is, the empty context. This is the case for frames where for a given i ∈ C, W i = ∅. This is an interesting expressive feature allowing for capturing, within the framework, also the notion of an inconsistent classification. In the knowledge representation setting we are operating in, where contexts have to be seen as normative systems with respect to which the counts-as statements are relativized, this simply amounts to accept the possibility of normative systems issuing inconsistent constitutive rules 7 . The natural question is now: is there a logic characterizing the class of these structures? The answer is positive and the system at issue corresponds to the logic: K45 ij n . Logic K45 ij n is axiomatized via the following axioms and rules schemata: . In other words, they express the fact that whether something holds in a context i is not something that a context j can influence. This is nothing but the syntactic counterpart of the property we discussed in relation with Definition 2 in Section 4.2.
The system is a subsystem of the EDL logic studied in [37] . The proof of the soundness and completeness of the system with respect to Cxt multi-frames can be derived by the proof of the completeness of EDL ( [37] ). However, a sketch of the proof is provided.
Proposition 3. (Soundness and completeness)
Logic K45 ij n is sound and complete with respect to the family of Cxt multiframes.
Proof. The desired result can be obtained in two steps. First, via the canonical model, it can be proven that logic K45 ij n is complete with respect to the class of transitive, and i-j euclidean (wR i w ∧ wR j w → w R j w ) frames 8 . Soundness is, as usual, straightforward. Second, it can be proven that if F is a Cxt multiframe then it is transitive and i-j euclidean. The reverse can be proven with 7 In [24] we ruled this possibility out considering only Cxt multi-frames with nonempty contexts. Those frames yield the logic KD45 ij n , which is also a well investigated system (see [34, 39] ). 8 In [39] , frames with this property are called hyper-euclidean.
respect to the class of transitive and i-j euclidean frames which are also rooted (∃w 0 ∈ W s.t. W = {w ∈ W | w 0 R i w}). The following well known invariance result about generated submodels 9 can then be exploited to prove soundness and completeness also with respect to Cxt n-frames: if a multi-modal logic is determined by (i.e., sound and complete w.r.t.) a class of multi-frames, then it is determined by the class of its rooted frames ( [16] ).
At this stage the logical machinery is semantically and syntactically worked out and it can be put to work.
Classificatory counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic K45 ij n on a language ML n , the classificatory view on counts-as statements can be given the following formal characterization. "γ 1 counts as γ 2 in context c", with γ 1 and γ 2 objective formulae, is formalized in a multi-modal language ML n as the strict implication in logic K45 ij n :
Notice that the definition constrains the counts-as conditionals ⇒ 
Proof. We provide only the deduction of Formula 8 as an example:
All other proofs are just as straightforward via application of Definition 3 and using the given axiomatization of K45 This system validates all the intuitive syntactic constraints isolated in [30] (Formulae 1-4). Besides, the analysis shows that counts-as conditionals, once they are viewed as conditionals of a classificatory nature, naturally satisfy reflexivity (Formula 5), transitivity (Formula 6), a form of "contextualized" antisymmetry (Formula 7), strengthening of the antecedent (Formula 8) and weakening of the consequent (Formula 9). We will come back to the discussion of these structural properties in Section 8.2.
Counts-as Beyond Contextual Classification
The previous Section has provided a formal analysis of the classificatory view of counts-as (Definition 3), explicating what logical properties are to be accepted once such an analytical option on the semantics of counts-as is assumed (Proposition 4). Some of these properties remain questionable if counts-as statements are interpreted in a different way.
Stronger forms of contextual classification
The classificatory perspective does not exhaust all aspects involved in the meaning of counts as statements. The analytic literature on constitutive norms often comes to emphasize a further characteristic feature: counts-as statements are not just classifications but "new" classifications, that is, classifications which would not hold without the normative system stating them:
Where the rule is purely regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule could be given the same description or specification (the same answer to the question "What did he do?") whether or not the rule existed, provided the description or specification makes no explicit reference to the rule. But where the rule (or system of rules) is constitutive, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive if the rule did not exist ( [44] , p.35).
The novelty of the classifications stated via counts-as is stressed by various different namings that the statements based on constitutive rules obtain in the literature. For instance, it is said that the occurrence of X conventionally generates the occurrence of Y ( [18] ) given the existence of a corresponding rule, or that the occurrence of Y supervenes on the occurrence of X ( [26] ).
In this view, counts-as does not just express contextual classifications but proper contextual classifications. In other words, X counts as Y in context C because X is classified as Y in C but also because this does not hold in general, i.e., in the global context. In this sense the notion of proper contextual classification captures the idea, which is explicit in the name "constitutive rules", of rules denoting the bringing about of something new, the constitution of something new. The classification is brought about, or constituted, by the normative system itself which specifies the context of the classification, and it would not hold without it. Once we represent this reading via the ⇒ cl+ c symbol, it is obvious to expect that from γ 1 ⇒ cl+ c γ 2 it does not follow, for instance, that γ 1 ∧ γ 3 ⇒ cl+ c γ 2 , because it might well be that to obtain γ 2 from γ 1 ∧ γ 3 no constitutive rule is needed at all. To provide a simple example: given that in the context of the animal ethics movement all animals count as (in a proper classificatory sense) individuals bearing rights, it does not follow that all animals which are humans count as (in a proper classificatory sense) individuals bearing rights, because the fact that humans are individuals bearing rights is a global ethical truth common to all ethical systems, which would therefore also hold without the animal ethics movement.
For analogous reasons, it does not seem reasonable to say, in the view of proper contextual classification, that X counts as X, since "X is X" is just a tautology, or that if X counts as Y , then X counts as Y or Z. In the light of these considerations, Formulae 5, 8 and 9 in Proposition 4 should turn out to be invalid in a formal characterization of proper contextual classification.
However, these two views on the semantics of counts-as, though different, are strictly related. We would indeed expect the contextual classification view to be implied by the proper contextual classification one, this last imposing a further requirement on the classification: not only a counts-as expresses that X is classified as Y in C, but it expresses also that this classification is something new, a characteristic of C. There is thus a clear logical relation between the two views: the fact that X counts as Y in the properly classificatory sense, implies that X counts as Y in the classificatory sense. This will be proven formally in Section 7.
How can the notion of contextual classification be restricted in order to find a characterization of counts-as that can account for the proper classificatory view on its semantics?
From classification to proper classification
As usual, model-theoretic considerations can give us crucial hints. Let us define the set T(X) of all formulae which, given a model, are satisfied by all worlds in a finite set of worlds X:
and let T → (X) be the set of all implications of objective formulae which are satisfied by all worlds in a finite set of worlds X:
Obviously, for every X: T → (X) ⊆ T(X). In the classificatory reading, given a model M where the set of worlds W c ⊆ W models context c, the set of all classificatory counts-as statements holding in c, which we denote as CL(W c ), can be defined as the set T → (W c ):
Hence, it is easy to see that: 
Intuitively, the set of proper classificatory count-as holding in c corresponds to the set of implications between objective formulae which hold in c, minus those implications which hold universally. This can be seen as the most natural amendment of the classificatory view toward the specification of a stronger notion of contextual classification. Section 6 is devoted to a detailed analysis of this interpretation of counts-as statements, which, we argue in Section 8.4, highly overlaps with the view of counts-as maintained in [30] . It is worth noting, in passing, that [25] investigates a yet different form of counts-as statements expressing that a classification is a defining element of a context. In that view, counts-as statements represent the constitutive rules of a system, that is, those rules which define the context of counts-as statements.
The definitions discussed in this section are summarized in the following table:
Contextual Classification
The first form of counts-as has been investigated in Section 4. The remainder of the paper focuses on the second form.
Counts-as as Proper Contextual Classification
In the following section a modal logic is developed which implements the definition stated in Formula 10 above. By doing this we will capture the intuitions discussed in Section 5 concerning the intuitive reading of counts-as statements in proper classificatory terms. At the same time we will maintain the possible worlds semantics of context exposed in Section 4 and developed in order to account for the purely classificatory view of counts-as. It will therefore be possible to represent both the investigated meanings within the same framework, and to account for their logical relations.
Expansion of ML n and semantics
Language ML n is expanded as follows. The set of context indexes C is such that it always contains the special context index u denoting the universal (or global) context. We call this language ML u n . Languages ML u n are given a semantics via a special class of Cxt multiframes, namely the class of Cxt multi-frames F = W, {W i } i∈C such that W ∈ {W i } i∈C . That is, the frames in this class, which we call Cxt , always contain the global context among their contexts.
The semantics for the expanded ML n is obtained adding the following clause to the definition of the satisfaction relation in Section 4.
Intuitively, the clause states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the universal 1-frame contained in each Cxt multi-frame. It is therefore nothing but a S5 necessity operator.
Axiomatics
We call Cxt u the logic characterizing the class of Cxt multi-frames. Logic Cxt u results from the union K45 
where i, j denote elements of the set of indexes C and u denotes the universal context index in C. This system is nothing but a notational variant of the system EDS (epistemic default logic) developed in [37] . We refer the reader to that work for a proof of the soundness and completeness of the system with respect to the semantics presented in the previous section.
Proper classificatory counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic Cxt u on a language ML u n , the proper classificatory reading of counts-as statements can be formalized as follows. 
Notice that this definition is nothing but the translation in the ML 
Proof. The invalidity of Formula 11 can be proven via reductio ad absurdum.
We have given in Section 5.1 an intuitive example showing why the strengthening of the antecedent fails for the notion of proper contextual classification. It might be instructive to provide at this point also an intuitive example for the failure of transitivity. Before 9/11, it was the case that many legal systems did not specify a legal notion of terrorism. In the context of the legal systems that did, the following were therefore proper contextual classifications since they were not holding in general: "the use or threat of action designed to influence the government and advance a political cause counts as terrorism"and "terrorism counts as a criminal activity". However, it could not be inferred from them that "the use or threat of action designed to influence the government and advance a political cause counts as a criminal activity" was a proper contextual classification, because what stated was anyway the case also in those legal systems disregarding a notion of terrorism. Intuitively, transitivity fails just because it is possible to constitute local middle terms within classifications which hold globally in the model. 
Contextualized antisymmetry, i.e., Formula 7 of Proposition 4 holds in the following form:
Cumulative transitivity (alias cut) is also valid:
Proof. The validity of Formulae 11-15 is easily proven. The validity of Formula 20 is easily shown via application of Definition 4. We provide a deduction of Formula 21:
Propositions 5 and 6, though very simple, are of key importance for putting our characterization of counts-as as proper contextual classification in perspective with other proposals. Such a comparison is elaborated in detail in Section 8.2.
Classification VS Proper Classification
The section is devoted to the analysis of the interrelationships between the two notions of contextual and proper contextual classification. First, their logical relations will be investigated and discussed in detail. It will then be shown how these notions behave with respect to the so-called transfer problem ( [30] ), and what kind of insights they offer on that issue. Finally, they will both be connected with the logical phenomenon of enthymemes, relating thus the analysis of countsas to broader logical issues. 
Logical relations between ⇒
Proof. The validity of Formula 22 follows directly from Definitions 3 and 4:
). The validity of Formula 23 follows from the validity of Formula 22, the validity of Formula 8 for ⇒ cl c (Proposition 4) and MP. Finally, the validity of Formula 24 follows also from the validity of Formula 22, the validity of Forula 6 of ⇒ Proper classificatory counts-as statements are impossible with respect to the uni- 10 It might be instructive to recall that such concern lies also at the ground of the Tarskian characterization of the notion of truth. Because of the inherent polysemy of the predicate "to be true", Tarski found it unconvincing to proceed introducing the predicate as a primitive and then axiomatizing it:
[. . . ] the choice of axioms always has rather accidental character, depending on inessential factors (such as e.g. the actual state of our knowledge Instead, he preferred to first isolate a precise sense of the predicate, i.e., truth as correspondence to reality, and then to define it in terms of a better understood notion, i.e., the notion of satisfaction of a formula by a model. Our whole work can be viewed as an application of this method to the notion of counts-as: we isolated two senses of the term, and we defined them via better-known notions like, especially, strict implication within a context. versal context u. In fact, the following formula is valid:
Proof. The proposition is easily proven considering that Definition 4 yields that 25 is equivalent to:
In other words, what holds in general is never product of constitution, it cannot be a "new" classification. This is indeed a very intuitive property: the fact that apples are classified as fruit cannot be a proper classification because it is something that always holds. Asserting that "apples count always as fruit" cannot be true in a proper classificatory sense. On the other hand, contextual classificatory statements are instead perfectly sound also with respect to the universal context (⇒ cl u ). In [30] , the property of the strengthening of the antecedent was rejected on the grounds of what is there called the transfer problem. This problem can be exemplified as follows: suppose that somebody brings it about -for instance by coercion-that a priest effectuates a marriage, does this count as the creation of a state of marriage? Does anything implying that a priest effectuates a marriage count as the creation of a state of marriage? In other words, is the possibility to create a marriage transferable to anybody who brings it about that the priest effectuates the ceremony?
It is beyond doubt that a characterization of counts-as which enjoys the strengthening of the antecedent also exhibits the transfer problem: if that property holds, then the fact that the performance of the ceremony counts as the creation of a state of marriage implies that also a coerced performance does. As already noticed in [24] , contextual classification (⇒ cl c ), which enjoys the strengthening of the antecedent (Proposition 4), does exhibit the transfer problem: whatever situation in which a priest performs a marriage ceremony is classified as a situation in which a marriage state comes to be. And this is precisely what we intuitively expect given the notion of contextual classification as informally introduced in Section 2. In other words, contextual classification should exhibit the transfer problem or, to put it another way, it should display a transfer property: the determining of a state of marriage should be transferable to any state in which a priest performs the ceremony.
In the previous sections it has been shown, instead, that the characterization of proper contextual classification (⇒ 
Intuitively, formula 26 expresses what follows. If the fact that a priest effectuates a marriage (γ 1 ) under coercion of a third party (γ 3 ) is not globally classified as giving rise to a state of marriage (γ 2 ) -which is the case, given the intuitive reading of the scenario at issue-then it is safe to say that if the priest's performance of the marriage counts as (in a proper classificatory sense) a marriage, then a coerced performance of the marriage counts also as a marriage.
Notice that this is again something perfectly intuitive given the assumptions about proper contextual classification exposed in Section 5: if a context c makes a classification γ 1 → γ 2 true, which does not hold in general, then also the strengthened version of it γ 1 ∧ γ 3 → γ 2 is true in that context. Besides, if the strengthened version is also not true in general, it then follows that γ 1 ∧ γ 3 → γ 2 is also a novel classification which is brought about by context c. Exhibiting the transfer problem is also for proper contextual classification not problematic.
From a technical point of view, Proposition 9 shows that a characterization of counts-as, which does not enjoy the strengthening of the antecedent, can still exhibit the transfer problem. This is equivalent to say that a notion of counts-as which genuinely rejects the transfer problem should not only reject antecedent strengthening, but some yet weaker property. In [25] we have investigated and motivated a stronger semantics of counts-as statements which do not exhibit the transfer problem, not even in the weakened sense of formula 26.
Finally, it is instructive to notice that a result such as Proposition 9 relies on the possibility of expressing a notion of global truth in the model ([u]-formulae). It follows that a purely conditional logic like the one used in [30] , could not represent formula 26 and, hence, it could not make explicit the discrepancy between the strengthening of the antecedent and the transfer problem. We introduced the notion of contextual classification for capturing a precise sense in which counts-as statements can be interpreted. Looking just at the formal machinery used, this section aims at showing the close relation that the notion of contextual classification enjoys with other logical notions. Contextual classification has been defined as an implicative statement holding with respect to a context, i.e., a set of valuations or, in the modal logic terminology, modal states (Definition 3). We have seen that the role of a context is to limit the set of states with respect to which the implicative statement is evaluated in order for it to represent a classification holding "locally" (see Section 4.3). As such, we can thus consider contexts to play the role of hidden collections of premises.
Inferences with hidden premises have a long history in logic. The ancient Greeks used to call them enthymemes from en, in, and thymos, mind, so as to mean some knowledge that is left implicit and kept in the mind. Counts-as statements state enthymemes in a very precise sense, the hidden premises being the constitutive rules of the normative system to which they pertain. A statement "X counts as Y in context C", interpreted as contextual classification, can therefore be rephrased as "it follows (classically) from the rules of the normative system specifying the context (i.e., set of models) C that X implies Y". Once the statement is considered abstracting from the set of rules of the relevant normative system -and this is the case in the Searlean analysis ( [44, 45] )-what remains is just a general notion of context, whose specification is left open, and whose function is just to localize the truth of the statement "X implies Y".
Enthymemes have been studied as special consequence operations in [35] , where they are shown to provide a bridge between classical logic and nonmonotonic logics. In that work the notion of enthymeme is captured by a specific logical consequence operation called pivotal-valuation consequence. The definition of this consequence operation runs as follows. No proof is needed to see that Definition 3 perfectly rephrases Definition 5 in a modal logic fashion. Contextual classification and pivotal-valuation consequence are, formally speaking, the same notion, and modal logics such as K45 ij n and Cxt u are logics in which the notion of pivotal-valuation (and therefore of enthymeme) can be studied at an object-language level 11 . It is in fact no surprise to see (Proposition 4) that all the properties characterizing pivotal-valuation consequences are enjoyed by our operator ⇒ cl c for contextual classification: reflexivity (Formula 5), antecedent strengthening or monotonicity (Formula 8), transitivity (Formula 6), the property of disjunction of the premises (Formula 4), and supraclassicality, that is, via pivotal-valuation consequence more can be inferred than what can be classically inferred, which in a modal logic setting means just what stated by instances of Axiom (⊆ .ui)
We have shown that counts-as statements, when interpreted as contextual classifications, can be sensibly viewed as enthymemes: "it follows (classically) from the rules of the normative system specifying the context (i.e., set of models) C that X implies Y". The very same analogy can be drawn for those counts-as statements denoting proper classifications. In this case the reading would run like this: "it follows (classically) from the rules of the normative system specifying the context (i.e., set of models) C that X implies Y, but it does not hold in general (i.e. in all models) that X implies Y". Proper contextual classification represents therefore an enthymeme where what is inferred from the implicit premises is something that cannot also be inferred from the empty set of premises, that is, what cannot be inferred also from the empty normative system.
Discussion
This section aims at putting our approach in perspective with the other formal approaches to counts-as available in the literature, and to present our results in a more general fashion. For doing this we address two points. First, we provide a detailed comparison of our semantics of proper contextual classification with the semantics of the counts-as conditional studied in [30] . Second, we provide a comparison of our two characterizations of counts-as with the other proposals in the literature by means of an analysis of the structural syntactic properties of each formalization.
A model-theoretic comparison
We provide now a quite technical comparison between our semantics for proper contextual classificatory statements (Section 6) and the minimal model semantics of counts-as proposed in [30] , which is based on minimal conditional models (Mcmodels) 12 .
Definition 6. (Mc-models for counts-as conditionals)
An Mc-model for counts-as conditionals in the fashion of [30] is a structure M such that: M = W, f i , I where f i : W × P ow(W ) −→ P ow(P ow(W )), that is, given a world w and a set of worlds X it assigns a finite set {Y 1 , ..., Y n } of sets of worlds, and f i is such that, for all X, Y, Z ⊆ W and w ∈ W :
12 It is be worth noticing that, although we will focus on proper contextual classification (⇒ cl+ c ), all considerations which will be made about the semantics of that notion hold also for the simpler semantics of contextual classification (⇒ cl c ).
The satisfaction relation for a generic counts-as operator ⇒ c based on this semantics would run as follows:
The semantics of counts-as conditionals just sketched consists therefore in a function assigning, for each world, sets of sets of worlds (i.e., sets of propositions) to sets of worlds (i.e., propositions). It is important to notice though, that the specification of this function is left completely abstract in the sense that nothing is said about what kind of set {Y 1 , ..., Y n } is to be expected given a set X (and a world w), i.e, about the kind of relation holding between the arguments and the values of f c . In fact, only abstract formal constraints are imposed on f c , and there can be indeed a number of different functions obeying those constraints.
We have already seen that the Mc-models semantics validates different principles for the counts-as operator (Section 6). In particular, it validates transitivity (third item in Definition 6) while the Cxt -models semantics for proper contextual classification does not (Proposition 5). On the other hand, the Mc-models semantics does not validate cumulative transitivity (cut), which is instead valid in our semantics, and it does not validate cautious monotonicity either, which is however invalid also in the Cxt -models semantics (Proposition 5)
13 .
Proposition 10. (Mc-models, Cut and Cautious Monotonicity)
Cumulative Transitivity (Cut) and Cautious Monotonicity of ⇒ c , i.e.:
are invalid in the Mc-models semantics.
Proof. It is easy to build the desired countermodels. A countermodel for Cut is provided by a model M and a world w s.t.: I (γ 2 ) ∈ f i (w, I (γ 1 )) and I (γ 3 ) ∈ f i (w, I (γ 2 )∩I (γ 1 )) and I (γ 3 ) ∈ f i (w, I (γ 1 )). An analogous countermodel can be found for Cautious Monotonicity.
Besides validating different principles the two semantics differ also in other more fine-grained respects. Let us recall Definition 4 and spell it out semantically:
and (∃w ∈ W : w ∈ I(γ 1 ) and w ∈ I(γ 2 )) (28) iff W c ∩ I(γ 1 ) ⊆ I(γ 2 ) and I(γ 1 ) ⊆ I(γ 2 )
where M is a Cxt -model: M = W, W, W c , I . These equivalences point to a couple of technical differences which nicely show where the most essential theoretical differences between the two approaches lie.
First of all, they show (Equivalence 28) that the truth of a proper contextual classification (⇒ cl+ c ) does not depend on the point of evaluation. In other words, the set of counts-as statements holding in a context does not depend on the state of evaluation in the model. This is not surprising since we have already seen, in Section 4, that our semantics presupposes the notion of truth in a context to be of a global kind. Instead, whether the truth of a counts-as in a Mc-model depends or not on the point of evaluation is an issue which is left unaddressed in [30] . In fact, although the function f i in a Mc-model takes the evaluation point as one of its two arguments, that work does not discuss whether the fact that f i (w, X) = f i (w , X) (i.e., the set of counts-as statements of normative system i in w is different from the set of those in w ) would model something meaningful at all. In our view it would not, since what determines the set of counts-as statements of a context is only the context itself and not the world. If f i (w, X) = f i (w , X), then i denotes, in fact, in w and w two different normative systems. Noticeably, this means that the approach held in [30] allows for a given index to denote different normative systems in different worlds. There is in principle nothing wrong with this, but what the motivation is for such a modeling choice should nevertheless be made explicit and discussed.
Second, they show that the truth of a proper contextual classification is a function of the context W c and of the interpretation function I. In fact, the truth of ⇒ cl+ c -formulae is determined by a set-theoretical relation between the evaluation of the antecedent (I(γ 1 )), the evaluation of the consequent (I(γ 2 )), and the context (W i ) (Equivalence 29). As a consequence, the truth of a ⇒ cl+ cformula is related to the truth of its antecedent and consequent. In fact, it is easy to see that the following hold on the grounds of Formula 29:
(w ∈ W c and M, w |= γ 1 ⇒ cl+ c γ 2 and M, w |= γ 1 ) implies M, w |= γ 2 (30) where M is a Cxt -model: M = W, W, W c , I . That is to say, if we are in context W c , and that context properly classifies γ 1 as γ 2 , and it is the case that γ 1 , then it is also the case that γ 2 . To put it another way, this shows how countsas statements, interpreted as proper contextual classifications, have an influence on what holds in a world.
In Mc-models instead, the function f i is in no way related to the evaluation function I and the index i does not get a concrete denotation in the model like in Cxt -models. Therefore, no formal relation such as the one in Formula 30 between the counts-as statement, the context, the antecedent and the consequent can be inferred. Intuitively, this means that the counts-as statements holding in a world, and the truth of their antecedents and consequents are completely independent from each other. We find this a quite counter-intuitive idea, since the role of counts-as statements is exactly to allow the logical connection of formulae which are otherwise logically unrelated.
This section has shown that what our semantics based on Cxt -models adds to the proposal in [30] amounts to three essential aspects: first, counts-as statements are of a global kind, i.e., their truth is independent of the point of evaluation in a model; second, indexes in counts-as statements have a precise semantics, i.e., they are contexts (sets of situations); third, counts-as statements correspond to precise set-theoretical relations between their context, their antecedent, and their consequent. All these features are nothing but the formal translation of the intuition from which our whole approach moves: counts-as statements represent the way a normative system classifies situations.
A Structural Comparison with other Approaches
Building on the results stated in Propositions 4, 5 and 6, this section and the two following ones discuss our approach from a merely structural perspective, showing which properties of ⇒ cl c and ⇒ cl+ c are accepted or rejected in the approaches developed in [30] and [17, 19] .
An overview of the main properties enjoyed by each characterization is provided in Table 8 .2. With "1" we denote that the notion of counts-as in the column enjoys the property in the row, with "0" vice versa.
⇒c in [30] in [17, 19] A Proposition 4 showed that ⇒ cl c enjoys strong properties (in particular reflexivity, antecedent strengthening, and transitivity) and displays, therefore, a very classical behavior. As shown by Proposition 5 and 6, the logic of ⇒ cl+ c behaves instead much less classically rejecting reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent, even in the weaker version of cautious monotonicity, and transitivity. On the other hand, it still retains a weaker form of transitivity, namely cumulative transitivity.
The approach proposed in [30] , which has already been discussed from a semantic point of view in Section 8.1, develops a logic for counts-as conditionals (denoted by the operator ⇒ c ) obeying the following principles: left logical equivalence (⇒ c -version of Formula 17), right logical equivalence (⇒ c -version of Formula 16), disjunction of antecedents (⇒ c -version of Formula 19), conjunction of the consequents (⇒ c -version of Formula 18) and transitivity (⇒ c -version of Formula 14) . Recall, though, that it does not enjoy cumulative transitivity and cautious monotonicity (Proposition 10).
In [17, 19] it is argued instead that the logic of counts-as conditionals, which they denote via the operator , amounts to the logic of preferential reasoning ( [31] ), preferential reasoning being characterized by the following properties: reflexivity ( -version of Formula 11), left logical equivalence ( -version of Formula 17), weakening of the consequent ( -version of Formula 13), conjunction of the consequents ( -version of Formula 18), cut ( -version of Formula 21), cautious monotonicity ( -version of Formula 15) and disjunction of the antecedents ( -version of Formula 19) 14 . This overview provides grounds for a number of interesting observations. First of all, notice that there seems to be a structural hard core of all characterizations of counts-as including ours, which corresponds to properties from D to G. These properties are exactly the ones recognized as a sort of minimal characterization of counts-as in [30] . There are then two remarkable facts to be noticed, which concern the relation between our notions of contextual and proper contextual classification and the notions of counts-as axiomatically characterized in [17, 19] and [30] . We discuss them separately in the following two sections.
Operator corresponds to a defeasible ⇒ cl c
The notion of counts-as statements as conditional counterparts of preferential reasoning ( [17, 19] ) represents a defeasible form of our notion of contextual classification, since the only properties distinguishing the two notions are strengthening of the antecedent (B) and transitivity (C), which in presence of reflexivity (A) and cut (I) are actually equivalent (see [31] ). In the light of our semantics-driven analysis of counts-as, this constitutes a very interesting fact. In a way, it allows us to attach a precise meaning to the notion of counts-as axiomatized in [17, 19] deriving it from the notion of contextual classification or enthymeme (see Section 7.3): if the statement "X counts-as Y in context C", intended as contextual classification, means "X is classified as Y in C", then the same statement read in the fashion of [17, 19] would mean "X is classified as Y in C, modulo exceptions", or "it normally follows from C that X is classified as Y". Yet another possible meaning of countsas statements is therefore disentangled which we might call defeasible contextual classification. The logic of this notion was already studied, from an axiomatic perspective, in [17, 19] but it can now get a precise place within the map of the many senses of the term "counts-as" we are sketching here. The notion of proper contextual classification appears to correspond to a slightly weaker version of the counts-as conditional studied in [30] where transitivity (C) is substituted by the weaker property of cumulative transitivity (I).
In fact, ⇒ Our analysis shows instead that once we first proceed to the isolation of the exact sense of the term "counts-as" we are aiming at formalizing, no room for uncertainty is then left about the syntactic properties enjoyed by the formalized notion: if we intend counts-as statements as proper contextual classifications, then transitivity must be rejected on the grounds of mere logical reasons.
The notion of proper contextual classification stemmed from the need for expressing the idea of novel classifications which can be brought about by a context (Section 5). The question remains now whether the approach developed in [30] aimed at formalizing yet a different meaning of counts-as statements, like the approach in [17, 19] did as we have shown in the previous section, or whether it was actually aiming at axiomatizing proper contextual classification. In this case the acceptance of transitivity would have been led by the sort of misunderstandings at which we pointed in Section 7.1 discussing Proposition 7. We favor indeed the second hypothesis, on the grounds of the following observations. We read in [30] :
Even if it were to transpire that convincing counter-examples to S [read transitivity] could be found, a weakened form of transitivity:
will nevertheless be a truth of the logic ( [30] , p.436).
In that work the operator D c is the operator of a multi-modal KD n logic and it aims at capturing a notion of "general institutional constraints". Now, if we interpret the D c operator as our [c] operator in logic Cxt u , and the ⇒ c operator as our ⇒ cl+ c operator, then the formula above is nothing but Formula 24, which was proven to be valid in logic Cxt u (Proposition 7). The strict implication under a D c would correspond indeed to contextual classification in context c. Such a move is not arbitrary since the choice for a KD n logic was explicitly considered in that work to be a "provisional proposal" ( [30] , p.437) and Cxt u is a stronger logic than KD n 15 .
Remarkably, the very same observation can be made for another crucial constraint on ⇒ c , which was intended in [30] to relate the notion of counts-as with the notion of "general institutional constraint":
Again, substituting ⇒ c and D c with ⇒ cl+ c and respectively [c], another validity of our framework is obtained, i.e., Formula 22 (Proposition 7).
To recapitulate, [30] did not consider transitivity to be ultimately established as an essential constraint for a characterization of counts-as. On the other hand they did consider essential two validities of our system (Formula 24 and Formula 22) expressing a logical relation between proper contextual classification and contextual classification. Furthermore, they provisionally assumed logic KD n as a logic for expressing institutional constraints, suggesting that stronger logics might actually work better.
It is therefore tempting to claim that what authors in [30] tried to axiomatize was actually the notion of proper contextual classification, and what they meant under the label "general institutional constraint" was nothing but the notion of truth in a context, i.e., what we have here represented via the [c] operator in logics K45 ij n or Cxt u . The temptation is then even stronger if we consider that the intuitive reading they attach to counts-as statements, in their informal analysis, essentially coincides with ours: X counts as Y is read as X "is to be classified as" Y, or X "guarantees the applicability of the classificatory category" Y ( [30] , pag. 431).
8.5 Some words on [9] [10] [11] In the structural comparison just exposed we did not take into consideration the formal approach to counts-as proposed in [9] [10] [11] . In that work, counts-as is investigated as an ingredient within a broader attempt to formalize normative systems as wholes, and especially the interaction between constitutive and regulative rules 16 . There are two essential aspects of that proposal which make it difficult to compare it with ours in the fashion followed above for [30] and [17, 19] .
First of all, counts-as statements represent in that work forms of consequence relation statements: X counts-as Y in context C iff from the input X and the context C it can be inferred, via the rules of the normative system, that Y. In effect, they do not propose a framework for studying the properties of countsas statements -there is nothing such as a counts-as operator in their languagebut rather a framework for drawing conclusions via the constitutive rules of a normative system. To put it another way, they are not interested in expressing that counts-as statements enjoy reflexivity, transitivity etc., but just that given a set of constitutive rules and an input a certain output follows.
In their view, counts-as statements represent thus the results of a reasoning process based on the constitutive rules of a given normative system. However -and this is the second aspect-no precise logic is chosen for specifying the reasoning process giving rise to the counts-as statements. Instead, a general framework based on input/output logics ( [36] ) is proposed, within which a number of different ways of drawing conclusions from the rules of the system can be specified. In the end, neither an actual proposal for the reasoning style grounding counts-as statements is set forth, apart from the rejection of reflexivity, nor the issue is addressed about what intuitive notion of counts-as would correspond to each of the possible inference styles which are specifiable in the framework.
Defeasibility and counts-as: a note
The previous sections dealt with the structural properties enjoyed by counts-as operators, discussing various answers to the question: "what properties should a genuine formal characterization of counts-as obey?" One such question in particular deserves some more considerations: "is counts-as defeasible?"
In discussing Proposition 7, we have already noticed that questions of this type can easily mislead the formal analysis when the to-be-analyzed notion displays a high level of vagueness and when there are reasons for believing that the name commonly attributed to that notion (counts-as) can actually hide not one but more notions (at least contextual classification and proper contextual classification).
There is also a second potential source of misunderstanding in this kind of questions. When we ask whether counts-as is or is not defeasible, are we asking whether the representation of counts-as via a specific operator of the objectlanguage enjoys antecedent strengthening, or whether antecedent strengthening is enjoyed by the logical consequence relation defined on the formulae of that object language, that is, whether the consequence relation of the logic is monotonic? In other words, are we asking whether a specific sense of the term "counts-as" inherently enjoys antecedent strengthening, or whether the reasoning we perform on counts-as statements is monotonic? It should be noted that, without the proof of a deduction theorem linking a counts-as operator with a corresponding consequence relation, these two questions are logically independent. However, the literature on counts-as never emphasizes this difference with the necessary precision.
As a matter of fact, logics with counts-as operators rejecting antecedent strengthening, such as our Cxt u for ⇒ cl+ c or the logic developed in [30] , feature monotonic consequence relations. In [17, 19] , instead, the counts-as operator rejects antecedent strengthening and, in addition, the consequence relation of the logic is also non-monotonic. On the other hand, the theory of an operator enjoying antecedent strengthening can be perfectly embedded in a logic endowed with a non-monotonic consequence relation. For instance, our logic K45 ij n for ⇒ cl+ c could straightforwardly be merged in a suitable argumentation system ( [41] ) providing the desired defeasible inferential properties, or, as it has been done in [37] , it can be extended including mechanisms for representing default reasoning. To a certain extent this is also what happens in [9] [10] [11] , where the defeasibility of counts-as is intended exactly as the non-monotonicity of the operation which extracts the consequences of a given input and the constitutive rules of a given system (see Section 8.5).
All these choices can have a precise rationale. However, what we want to stress here is that the two issues are radically different in nature. The first concerns the set of validities involving counts-as statements (in the various senses of the term "counts-as"), i.e., the logical properties of counts-as statements as they have been studied in Propositions 4 and 6. The second concerns instead the way statements can soundly (in the various senses of the term "sound") be inferred from other statements and in this case from counts-as statements, i.e., the possible reasoning patterns involving counts-as. To use a philosophical terminology, the first issue is of an ontological kind (what are the validities concerning counts-as statements?), while the second is of an epistemological one (what can be inferred on the grounds of counts-as statements?). In this work we have predominantly addressed the first issue.
Conclusions
Moving from hints provided by the literature on legal and social theory concerning constitutive rules, the paper has analyzed counts-as statements as forms of contextual classifications. This analytical option, which we have studied from a model-theoretic perspective (Sections 4 and 5), has delivered two semantically precise senses in which counts-as statements can be interpreted, which we called classificatory and, respectively, proper classificatory readings. The two readings have then be formally analyzed making use of modal logic.
The classificatory reading resulted in a strong logic of counts-as conditionals enabling many properties which are typical of reasoning with concept subsumptions such as, in particular, reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent and weakening of the consequent (Proposition 4). In fact, the logic obtained is nothing but a modal logic version of the contextual terminological logic we investigated in [22, 23] . It has been shown (Section 8.3), that this notion is a close relative of the counts-as studied in [17, 19] which constitutes, from a structural point of view, the defeasible version of contextual classification. This is not surprising if we consider, as shown in Section 7.3, that contextual classification corresponds to a specific notion of logical consequence relation (Definition 5) which constitutes a well-known bridge between monotonic and non-monotonic logics.
The characterization of proper contextual classification resulted, instead, in a much weaker logic rejecting reflexivity, transitivity and antecedent strengthening (Proposition 5), but retaining cumulative transitivity (Proposition 6). Noticeably, it has been shown (Section 8.4) that this notion corresponds to the counts-as characterized in [30] once transitivity is substituted with cumulative transitivity. We claimed indeed that the axiomatization proposed in [30] was aiming at capturing precisely the notion of proper contextual classification. Also the semantics of counts-as conditionals proposed in [30] has been subject to thorough investigation and its theoretical shortcomings emphasized (Section 8.1).
Finally, the notion of proper contextual classification has offered some new insights on the transfer problem (Section 7.2) showing that it cannot be genuinely avoided just by means of rejecting the strengthening of the antecedent in a conditional logic setting (Proposition 9). This result motivated the investigation of a yet stronger form of counts-as which we developed in [25] , and which stems nevertheless from the same analytical option backing the present work.
The logical interrelationships between contextual classification and proper contextual classification have also been studied (Proposition 7) showing, interestingly, that the logical relations between these two readings could actually be grounds for fallacies in the formal characterization of counts-as once the polysemy of the term "counts-as" is overlooked.
All in all the main contribution of the work consists, in our view, in showing how the logical systematization of the notion of counts-as can be grounded on a very simple intuition about what counts-as statements actually mean, i.e., forms of classification.
